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The Death Knell of the Legislative
Environmental Impact Statement: A
Critique of Public Citizen v. US. Trade
Representative'
I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement2 ("NAFTA") is
an agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico that
dramatically reduces trade barriers between the three countries.
Since its inception in 1991, environmental organizations have been
concerned about NAFTA's potential impact upon the United
States' environment. The Agreement, and supplemental accords,3
contained little to placate the concerns of organizations such as the
Sierra Club, Public Citizen, and Friends of the Earth, who feared
that U.S. laws protecting public health and safety would be
adversely affected by NAFTA' Ever since the early stages of
1. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5
F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). In the district and circuit
courts, the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth were also parties to the suit. Friends of
the Earth did not join in the Supreme Court appeal.
2. The House of Representatives voted to pass the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act on November 17, 1993. The Senate passed NAFTA on
November 20, 1993. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C. (1994)). NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 1994. North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § l(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3301(b) (1993).
3. President Clinton negotiated the side agreements with the intention of addressing
some of the concerns that the environmental and labor movements had about NAFTA.
The side agreements were finalized on August 13, 1993. Press Conference on the Topic
of the North American Free Trade Agreement, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 13, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, NAFTA File.
4. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d
549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-560) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellees]; SIERRA CLUB,
ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE NORTH
AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (1993). The organizations'
concerns about NAFTA included the potential preemption of state and federal health and
safety laws, the lack of public access to dispute resolution procedures, and poorly-enforced
environmental standards in Mexico. Id.
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NAFTA negotiations,5 these organizations sought to attain an
environmental assessment of NAFTA in accordance with the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").6 NEPA requires
administrative agencies to prepare environmental impact state-
ments for all proposals of legislation that might adversely affect
the health of the public.7 Because the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative ("USTR") refused to prepare such an impact
statement on NAIFTA, the groups sought redress in the courts. In
June of 1993, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth
won their case before Judge Ritchey in the U.S. District Court. In
Public Citizen v. US. Trade Representative ("Public Citizen 2"),8
Judge Ritchey held that the Office of the USTR, the agency that
negotiated the agreement, must prepare an environmental impact
statement for NAFTA.9
On appeal, the district court decision was reversed. In Public
Citizen v. US. Trade Representative ("Public Citizen 3"),"° the
D.C. Court of Appeals held that the environmental impact
statement requirement applies only if there is a final agency
action." The court of appeals found that NAFTA was not a final
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), x2 but would only become final when the President
submitted the proposal to Congress.13 The court reasoned further
that because presidential action is not subject to the APA, the
APA did not apply to NAFTA and its implementing legislation.
Consequently, the court found that the USTR need not fulfill the
NEPA mandate14 that an environmental impact statement
("EIS") be prepared for any "recommendation or report on
5. The organizations first brought suit to compel the Office of the Trade Represen-
tative to prepare an EIS for NAFTA and GATT in 1992. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade
Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
6. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 2, 101-102,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,4331-
4332 (1988).
7. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
8. 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993).
9. Id.
10. 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
11. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade
Representative on January 10, 1994. Public Citizen and Sierra Club v. U.S. Trade
Representative, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994) (denying petition for certiorari). Thus, the Court of
Appeals' opinion is final-at least for the D.C. Circuit.
12. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 552, 701 (1988).
13. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 551.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
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proposals for legislation and other major Federal Actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment."15
The implications of this decision merit careful consideration
because the net effect of the holding is to exclude the Office of the
USTR from agency status under the APA and NEPA. As the
USTR is granted primary responsibility for negotiating foreign
trade agreements, no international agreement negotiated by this
office will be subject to the EIS requirement of NEPA in the
future. In fact, this decision casts doubt upon the role of the EIS
in many administrative agency-related proposals for legislation
because no agency-prepared materials are truly final until they are
implemented or enacted by Congress.
This Note briefly explains the significance of the legislative
EIS in order to illustrate what is at stake in the Public Citizen
cases. This Note then compares the court of appeals' decision in
Public Citizen v. US. Trade Representative with the decision of the
district court. Next, this Note argues that the district court was
correct in holding that NAFTA was a "final agency action" as
defined by the APA, NEPA, and case law and, thus, that NAFTA
should have gone through the EIS process. This Note then
explores the potential impact of the court of appeals' decision on
future trade agreements and other administrative agency actions.
This Note concludes that NEPA's environmental impact statement,
to fulfill its intended role, must be applied to foreign trade
agreements.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE EIS
Public Citizen brought a series of cases to compel the USTR
to prepare an EIS on NAFTA 1 6 Clearly, Public Citizen believed
there was an important right at stake-the right to know how
NAFTA would impact the U.S. environment. When Congress
passed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, it provided
a mechanism by which agencies must document and review the
15. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
16. The cases brought by Public Citizen include Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade
Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 685 (1994) and Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139
(D.D.C.), affd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Recently, Public Citizen also brought a case
to compel the USTR to prepare an EIS on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
See Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994).
1994]
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potential impact of their actions.17 The purpose of NEPA is "[t]o
declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environ-
ment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man. .... ",, The EIS plays a primary role in achieving NEPA's
goals. The Code of Federal Regulations explains:
The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is
to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies
and goals defined in the [National Environmental Policy] Act
are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the
Federal Government. [The EIS] shall provide full and fair
discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform
decision-makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives
which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the
quality of the human environment. ... It shall be used by
Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to
plan action and make decisions.19
EISs are required for a variety of governmental actions.'
Specifically, they are required in all "recommendation[s] or
report[s] on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."21 There are several different kinds of EISs: programmatic
17. Congressional policy reasons for implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act are explained in 42 U.S.C. § 4331:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment ... declares that it
is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State
and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to
use all practicable means and measures ... to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony .... Id.
The EIS is explained as the mechanism of choice to enforce the policies of NEPA in 42
U.S.C. § 4332:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal Government shall... (C) include in every recommenda-
tion or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal Actions...
a detailed statement by the responsible official on the environmental impact of
the proposed action. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
19. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.1 (1993).
20. See Dinah Bear, Nuts and Bolts of Procedural Compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act, C933 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 7-8 (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
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EISs are prepared for major federal actions, programs, plans, and
policies, while site-specific EISs address changes in proposals later
in an agency's decision-making process.22 At issue in the Public
Citizen cases is the legislative EIS, which exists to provide
Congress and the public with information on the environmental
effects of legislative proposals.'
Public Citizen sought an EIS on NAFTA to force the USTR
to contemplate the potential environmental risks that NAFTA
could pose and to ensure that Congress could consider the EIS
when voting on the North American Free Trade Implementation
Act. Although the USTR had not prepared EISs for past trade
agreements, nothing in the Trade Act of 1974, the APA, or NEPA
exempted the Office of the USTR from NEPA requirements.24
Thus, Public Citizen brought suit to compel the USTR to comply
with federal law and prepare an EIS.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC CITIZEN CASES
The controversy decided by the court of appeals on Septem-
ber 24, 1993 was clearly laid out in Public Citizen 2.25 In Public
Citizen 2, the Government contended that NAFTA was not a final
agency action-thus, no EIS was required.26 Public Citizen, on
the other hand, asserted that because the USTR had completed
preparation of NAFTA, it was required to prepare an EIS.27
Accordingly, Judge Ritchey held that NEPA requires the USTR
to prepare an EIS for NAFTA and its implementing legislation.'
In granting Public Citizen's motion for summary judgement, Judge
Ritchey ordered the USTR to prepare an EIS immediately.
29
22. Bear, supra note 20, at 7-8.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). For an explanation of the purposes of the legislative EIS,
see Izaak Walton League of America v. Callaway, 480 F. Supp. 972 (D.D.C. 1979), affd
sub nom. Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In
Izaak Walton League, the court stated: "a legislative EIS is primarily prepared for the
benefit of Congress." Id. at 974. The court also stated that the legislative EIS exists "to
provide detailed environmental information to the public to permit them to participate in
a meaningful way in further decisionmaking both at the administrative and legislative
levels." Id. at 976.
24. Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a
Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279, 1283-84 (1992).
25. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993).
26. Id. at 23.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at 30-31.
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The court of appeals reversed Judge Ritchey's decision and
decided the case on the narrower issue of whether the USTR
action of negotiating NAFTA was final-that is, whether the
President or the USTR was primarily responsible for the drafting
of NAFTA.3 °
Public Citizen petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari; however, the Supreme Court declined to review the
appellate court's decision on January 10, 1994.31
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE
PUBLIC CITIZEN CASES
The Government put forth several arguments to support its
position that an EIS was unnecessary for NAFTA.32 First, the
Government asserted that NAFTA was an action of the President,
and therefore was not, under the APA, subject to NEPA.33 The
Government relied heavily on Franklin v. Massachusetts' to
support this contention. Second, the Government argued that
NEPA's application to NAFTA would conflict with the Trade Act
of 1974."5 Finally, the Government asserted that NAFTA's
potential effect on the environment was too indirect and remote
to be analyzed in an EIS.
36
Public Citizen, on the other hand, argued that the USTR, and
not the President, was primarily responsible for NAFTA. 37
Public Citizen contended that the USTR was a federal agency and
subject to the APA. Because it is subject to the APA, the
USTR-ike all other federal agencies-is subject to the require-
30. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 3 F.3d 549, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
31. Public Citizen and Sierra Club v. U.S. Trade Representative, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994)
(denying petition for certiorari).
32. Brief for the Appellants at 18-19, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822
F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993) (No. 93-5212) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellants].
33. Id. at 19.
34. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). In this case, the Supreme Court
held that the Secretary of Commerce's compilation of 1990 census figures was not a final
agency action under the APA. The census tally was only final once the President had
reviewed the figures and made his recommendations for reapportionment to Congress.
The President, not the Secretary of Commerce, was responsible for taking final action
regarding the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives. Because executive
actions are not reviewable under the APA, jurisdiction for review was denied.
35. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 19.
36. Id.
37. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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ments of NEPA.38 Public Citizen argued that the Trade Act of
1974 supported, rather than diminished, the proposition that
NAFTA was a product of the USTR, and not of the President.39
Finally, Public Citizen argued that the environmental threat
presented by NAFTA was sufficiently foreseeable and concrete to
document in an EIS.40
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the APA
Central to the inquiry in Public Citizen 2 was whether the
USTR qualified as an agency under the APA.4' This was impor-
tant for two reasons. First, the judiciary's jurisdiction to review
agency action comes from the APA.42 In Public Citizen 2, the
plaintiffs gained standing to question the USTR's failure to
prepare an impact statement under APA jurisdiction.43 Second,
the USTR is only subject to NEPA if it is considered an ad-
ministrative agency under the APA.
Because NEPA does not provide for a private cause of action
if an agency fails to prepare an EIS, Public Citizen rested its cause
of action upon the APA, which provides for subject matter
jurisdiction of "final agency actions by a party adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute."'  Public Citizen alleged that its membership would be
adversely affected by the USTR's failure to comply with NEPA.45
NEPA qualifies as a relevant statute under the language of the
APA.46
This raises two questions: (1) whether the USTR is an agency
under the APA, and (2) what constitutes a final agency action
sufficient to trigger review under the APA.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 550-51.
41. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 23 (D.D.C. 1993).
See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 701.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 551.
43. Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. at 24.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 701.
45. Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. at 24.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 701.
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1. The USTR is an Agency Under the APA
The USTR must qualify as an agency under the APA in order
for NEPA's EIS requirement to apply.4 7  Under the APA, an
agency is any "authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agen-
cy. 148 In Public Citizen 2, Judge Ritchey held that the USTR was
an agency under the APA and that its action was final upon
completing the negotiation of NAFTA.49 Congressional intent
and case law demonstrate that the USTR is considered an agency
for the purposes of the APA.5 °
The following factors show that Congress intended the USTR
to be considered an administrative agency for APA purposes.
First, the Trade Act of 1974 is the legislative act that created the
USTR and gave it agency status.51 The Trade Act supports the
USTR's status as a federal agency by placing it in the Executive
Branch.52 Further, the USTR's top officials are subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate.53 Additionally, the USTR is
responsible for making reports to Congress with respect to trade
agreements and international trade negotiations.' The USTR is
also bound by the APA's Freedom of Information require-
ments.55
Case law also supports that the USTR should be considered
an administrative agency. Judge Ritchey pointed to the test set
out in Soucie v. David5 for a common law definition of what
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
49. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 24 (D.D.C. 1993).
50. See Trade Act of 1974 § 141, 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1988); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
51. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2171.
52. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(a). In general, administrative agencies are part of the Executive
Branch. This does not, however, relieve agencies of their APA obligations. GEOFFREY
R. STONE, CONSTrTUnONAL LAw 413-33 (2d ed. 1991).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b).
54. Id. § 2171(c)(1)(H).
55. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21,25 n.4 (D.D.C. 1993).
Under the Code of Federal Regulations, the USTR acknowledges its duty to provide
information to the public "in compliance with the requirements of section 552 of title 5,
U.S.C. as amended." Commerce and Foreign Trade, Freedom of Information Policies and
Procedures, 15 C.F.R. § 2004.1 (1994). 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) requires all agencies to make
certain information about rule-making procedures available to the public.
56. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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should be considered a Federal agency." In Soucie, the court of
appeals held that "the APA ... confers agency status on any
administrative unit with substantial independent authority in the
exercise of specific functions."5 In Public Citizen 2, the court
held that because "[t]he Office of the United States Trade
Representative has a separate statutory basis for its authority and
has many separate responsibilities aside from assisting and advising
the President ... the [USTR] is an agency subject to the APA."'9
Further, the Council on Environmental Quality, when explaining
who must prepare an EIS, defines "Federal Agency" as "all
agencies of the Federal government."'
On appeal, the Government did not dispute that the USTR
was an agency under the APA. Instead, the court of appeals
directly addressed the finality requirement, found that the agency's
action was not final, and thus was not reviewable by the judicia-
ry.
61
2. NAFTA as Drafted by the USTR is a Final Agency Action
Under the APA
The most critical point of the Ritchey holding, and the point
upon which the case was overturned on appeal, was whether the
USTR's role in drafting NAFTA constituted a final agency action.
The facts support an affirmative answer to this question.
The USTR had a significant involvement in the preparation,
negotiation, and drafting of NAFTA.62 Ambassador Carla Hills,
the U.S. Trade Representative under President Bush, guided the
negotiations.63 When Public Citizen challenged the USTR in
1993 for not preparing an EIS on NAFTA, there were many
indicators of NAFTA's finality. For example, NAFTA as drafted
by the USTR was accepted by representatives of the United States,
57. Public Citizen, 822 F.2d at 25 n.4.
58. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1073.
59. Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. at 25 n.4, See infra part IV(A)(2)(iv) for an
explanation of the relevance of CEQ interpretations.
60. Council on Environmental Quality, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.12
(1993).
61. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
62. See Stuart Auerbach, U.S., Canada, Mexico Near Accord on Trade; Pact Would
Remove Tariffs Over 15 Years, WASH. PosT, Aug. 12, 1992, at Fl; see also Brief for
Appellees, supra note 4, at 4-6.
63. See Auerbach, supra note 62, at Fl.
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Canada, and Mexico on August 12, 19 92 .64 That same version of
NAFTA was signed by President Bush on December 17, 1992.65
Finally, the language of NAFTA was not changed before it was
submitted to and approved by Congress in the fall of 1993.' In
pointing to NAFTA as conceived of by the USTR, the plaintiffs
were pointing to a specific proposal for legislation or other
identifiable action or event which "at least arguably trigger[ed] the
agency's obligation to prepare an impact statement." 67
Public Citizen brought its suit seeking an EIS for NAFTA in
1993-after the USTR and President Bush signed the completed
draft of the Agreement in 1992 without having prepared an EIS.
Judge Ritchey found that NAFTA, at that point, constituted a
specific proposal for legislation.' He contrasted Public Citizen
2 with the 1992 case, Public Citizen v. US. Trade Representative
("Public Citizen 1,,),69 in which Public Citizen brought a similar
suit to require the USTR to prepare an EIS for NAFTA.' In
the earlier case, the court did not find final agency action because
NAFTA was then still under negotiation.7'
For purposes of the APA, a proposal for legislation is final
when it is specific and concrete.72 NAFTA as drafted and signed
by Ambassador Hills was specific and concrete. 73  By the time
Public Citizen brought its suit, President Clinton had stated that he
intended to submit the same version of NAFTA to Congress.74
Thus, even the President acted as if NAFTA was final once signed
by the USTR.
64. President's Statement on the Completion of Negotiations on the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1423 (Aug. 12, 1992).
65. President's Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement, 28
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2362 (Dec. 17, 1992).
66. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
19 U.S.C. (1993)).
67. Found. on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining
Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
68. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1993).
69. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C.), affd, 970
F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
70. Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. at 27 n.5.
71. Public Citizen, 970 F.2d at 919.
72. Council on Environmental Quality, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508
(1993).
73. Auerbach, supra note 62, at Fl; Mark Memmott, Accord Benefits Will Come
Gradually, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1992, at 9B.
74. Keith Bradsher, The Free-Trade Accord: Three Nations Resolve Issues Holding Up
Trade Pact Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1993, at Al.
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Yet, the Government argued not only that NAFTA was not
final at the time Public Citizen brought its suit, but also that the
USTR was not the party responsible for it.75 The district court
found that the USTR was the party substantially responsible for
drafting NAFTA, as the Trade Act vests the USTR with responsi-
bility "for conducting international trade negotiations, developing
and coordinating United States trade policy and imposing any
retaliatory trade sanctions on other countries., 76 The Trade Act
itself sheds some insight on the responsibilities of the USTR in
relation to final agency action.
i. The Trade Act of 1974
A strong argument asserted by the Government to defeat the
applicability of an EIS to NAFTA was the doctrine of separation
of powers. The Government contended that the Trade Act of
1974 inextricably bound up the role of the President with the role
of the USTR; therefore, any demand on the USTR to comply with
APA procedures impermissibly intruded on the President's
domain.' This argument is problematic. According to the Trade
Act of 1974, the USTR "shall serve as the President's chief
negotiator in trade matters.,
78
Thus, Congress clearly delegated the power to negotiate
foreign trade rules to the USTR. The President oversees the
USTR's actions, but the USTR is the one Congress vested with the
power to negotiate foreign trade rules. The Government claimed
that the USTR should be exempt from APA jurisdiction because
it is an agency located "within the Executive Office of the
President. '79 This language is non-conclusive. According to the
general constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, Congress
is the branch vested with the power to make law. Over time,
however, Congress has developed a policy of delegating its power
to make law to administrative agencies.' ° Congress also realized
75. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 22-24.
76. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1993)
(citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 2171, 2411-2417).
77. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 13.
78. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c).
79. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 13.
80. STONE, supra note 52, at 413-33. Stone explains that "the conventional
understanding that the legislature is the exclusive lawmaker-no longer reflects reality.. ..
[A]dministrative agencies, which are generally part of the executive branch, have been
19941
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that this delegation of power could potentially impact the public.
Thus, Congress passed the APA to provide judicial review of
administrative agency actions.
8'
Conceptually, administrative agencies are located within the
executive branch.Y2 Thus, the assertion that the USTR is located
in the executive office contradicts the contention that it is exempt
from the mandates of the APA. Congress delegated the power to
make laws concerning foreign trade to the USTR, and Congress
defined the USTR as being located within the executive branch. 3
The USTR, like any other agency, was created by Congress and is
governed by the APA. The USTR even considers itself an ad-
ministrative agency for the purposes of complying with the
Freedom of Information policies and procedures of the APA. 4
ii. Supplemental Agreements Are Not Relevant to NAFTA's
Finality
The Government also implied that President Clinton's
negotiation of side agreements before submitting NAFTA to
Congress was further evidence that NAFTA was not final.8 5 Yet,
the side agreements to NAFTA were not a part of NAFTA and
were not subject to the bicameralism and presentment require-
ments that all legislation must undergo.' They did not require
congressional approval to be effectuated. Rather, the side
agreements were executive agreements between President Clinton,
the President of Mexico, and the Prime Minister of Canada.
Nothing in NAFTA acknowledges the existence of the supplemen-
tal agreements, nor does anything bind Mexico, Canada, and the
United States to follow them. The supplemental agreements are
granted considerable lawmaking power." Id. at 415.
81. Id. See also 5 U.S.C. § 702, which provides for judicial review of administrative
agency actions.
82. See STONE, supra note 52, at 415.
83. See 19 U.S.C. § 2171(a) (stating that "there is established within the Executive
Office of the President the Office of the United States Trade Representative."). See also
§ 2171(c)(1)(A) (stating that "The United States Trade Representative shall have primary
responsibility for developing, and for coordinating the implementation of, United States
international trade policy ....").
84. Commerce and Foreign Trade, Freedom of Information Policies and Procedures,
15 C.F.R. §§ 2004, 2005 (1994).
85. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 16.
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. "Every Bill which shall have passed the House
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States; If he approves he shall sign it . . . ." Id.
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"gentlemen's agreements," which did not implicate NAFTA's
finality in any way.
NAFTA itself could only be changed by reopening negotia-
tions with Mexico and Canada, which the President did not do.
NAFTA became final during the Bush Administration.' The fact
that President Clinton drafted supplemental agreements to try to
correct the portions of NAFTA he found unsatisfactory, rather
than reopen negotiations, supports NAFTA's finality. According-
ly, in Public Citizen 2, Judge Ritchey found that the negotiation of
side agreements did not affect the finality of NAFTA itself.88
iii. The Effect of Fast Track Legislation
NAFFA was not just a treaty; it was a composition of imple-
menting legislation that needed to be signed by both Houses of
Congress to take effect.8 9 As NAFTA was "fast track" legisla-
tion, it was submitted to Congress exactly as drafted by the USTR
and could not be amended.' Once NAFTA was submitted for
consideration, Congress had ninety days to debate and vote on the
Agreement. 91 To prove that the President, and not the USTR,
had primary responsibility for NAFTA, the Government argued in
Public Citizen 2 that the purpose of "fast track" procedures is to
bolster the President's accountability and negotiating power with
foreign nations.' "Fast track" gives the President "the ability to
assure his negotiating partners that the agreement reached interna-
tionally would be the agreement voted on at home." 93 Further,
the President has stated that fast track "means that we will not
87. President's Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement, supra
note 65, at 2362.
88. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21,30 n.3 (D.D.C. 1993).
89. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1)(B). One commentator explains that "NAFTA is ... a
nonself-executing congressional-executive agreement entered into by authority of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which authorizes the President to
negotiate trade agreements but requires implementing legislation by Congress before an
agreement may enter into force." Robert W. Benson, Free Trade As an Extremist
Ideology: The Case of NAFTA, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 555, 572 (1994) (explaining
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902-2903 (1988)).
90. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2194, 2902-2903 for requirements of fast track approval
process.
91. Id.
92. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 14 n.2.
93. President's Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Small Business Person
of the Year Award and an Exchange with Reporters, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 574
(May 7, 1991).
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tinker with trade agreements worked out by our negotiators and
their foreign counterparts. "' This statement directly contradicts
the Government's contention that NAFTA was not final once the
trade representatives of Canada, Mexico, and the United States
concurred that it was.
The prevailing argument in Public Citizen 3 was that NAFTA
was not final until the President submitted it to Congress because
the President reserved the right to amend the Agreement until that
time.95 Yet, the President himself stated that the term "'fast
track' promises that we will not attach amendments or make
changes, since to do so could force negotiators to call off talks or
start again from square one."96 The purpose of the "fast track"
procedure is to assure that agreements negotiated and finalized
abroad will be the ones approved at home and to specifically
discourage the President from altering agreements once the USTR
completes them.
Although in theory the President reserved the right to amend
or alter NAFTA, he did not.' The version of NAFTA submitted
to Congress was the same draft approved by representatives of
Mexico, Canada, and the United States.9" In order to alter
NAFTA, the President would have had to reopen negotiations
with Mexico and Canada and undercut his own explanation of the
purpose of "fast track." That NAFTA was negotiated and passed
according to "fast track" procedures greatly supports the conten-
tion that it was complete when it left the USTR's hands. The
President's role in finalizing NAFTA was largely procedural. The
substantive portion of the Agreement was drafted by the USTR,
and the "fast track" procedure ensured that the USTR's substan-
tive draft was offered for Congressional approval. Consequently,
Judge Ritchey had ample evidence to support the proposition that
94. See President's Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Meeting of the
Society of Business Editors and Writers, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 537 (May 1, 1991)
(emphasis added).
95. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 3 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
96. See President's Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Meeting of the
Society of Business Editors and Writers, supra note 94.
97. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 9-10.
98. Trade Representatives from Mexico, Canada, and the United States signed
NAFTA on August 12, 1992. Auerbach, supra note 62, at Fl. Although implementation
of the Agreement depended upon approval by the legislatures of the three countries,
NAFTA was in its final form-the form it was in when considered by those bodies-at the
time Public Citizen brought suit seeking an EIS.
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NAFTA was final upon the USTR's signing, and not at a later
date.
iv. The Council on Environmental Quality's Interpretation of
Final Agency Action under NEPA
An agency is only required to prepare an EIS for legislative
proposals that might adversely affect the public's health.99 At
issue in the Public Citizen cases is what constitutes a proposal for
legislation sufficient to trigger the EIS requirement. One ex-
planation comes from the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ").1°  The Supreme Court has stated that the CEQ's
"interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference."'
01
In Public Citizen 2, the district court yielded to this deference.2
The CEQ provides specifically that, for purposes of NEPA:
[L]egislation includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress
developed by or with the significant cooperation and support of
a federal agency . . . . The test for significant cooperation is
whether the proposal is in fact predominately that of the agency
rather than another source.. . . Proposals for legislation include
requests for ratification of treaties.0 3
Case law supports the contention that a federal agency is still
required to prepare an EIS even if a project is not exclusively that
agency's endeavor."°  Courts consider whether the proposal is
predominantly that of the agency to be persuasive. 5 Thus, even
if the President had some input, the USTR was the entity predomi-
nantly in charge of NAFTA. Although the Government contend-
ed in the Public Citizen cases that Presidents Clinton and Bush
99. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
100. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1993).
101. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). See also Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989).
102. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1993).
103. Council on Environmental Quality, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17
(1993).
104. See Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D.Cal. 1985)
(holding that various federal agencies violated NEPA when they failed to prepare an EIS
before issuing construction permits on federally-owned land); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769
F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that when the U.S. Corps of Engineers granted a permit
for part of a construction project, an EIS was required for the entire project).
105. Id. See Council on Environmental Quality, NEPA and Agency Planning, 40
C.F.R. § 1501.5. See also Bear, supra note 20, at 5 ("When there is more than one federal
agency either proposing an action or involved in the same action or group of actions, a
'lead' agency supervises the preparation of the EIS.").
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played "a direct personal role at every stage of NAFTA pro-
cess,"' 6 the USTR is vested by law with the "primary responsi-
bility for developing, and for coordinating the implementation of,
United States international trade policy . . . ."" Furthermore,
the USTR has "lead responsibility for the conduct of, and shall be
the chief representative of the United States for, international
trade negotiations . . . ."0 Although the President plays a role
in guiding the agency's policies, the Office of the USTR, and not
the President, crafted the proposal for NAFTA and its implement-
ing legislation.
If the court of appeals in Public Citizen 3 had heeded the
CEQ's determination that "proposals for legislation [must be]
predominantly that of the agency ... [and] include requests for
ratification of treaties,"' 9 then it would have considered NAFTA
a proposal for legislation sufficient to trigger the EIS requirement.
NAFTA was primarily the action of a federal agency (the USTR),
and it is a proposal that will have a significant effect on the human
environment. These facts make it difficult to understand how the
guidelines of the CEQ, which define what is considered an agency
action sufficient to trigger the EIS requirement, can be interpreted
to mean anything other than that the USTR is required by law to
prepare an EIS on its proposal for legislation-NAFTA.
Still, the court of appeals found there was no basis on which
to compel the USTR to prepare an EIS." ° Although the court
did not determine whether the USTR was an agency, it did find
that the USTR's action in preparing NAFTA was not final."'
As the court can only review final agency actions, it found there
was no mechanism for review under the APA."
2
B. The Purpose of the Legislative EIS is Thwarted if It Does
Not Apply to NAFTA
The goal of the legislative EIS is to spur administrative
agencies to consider potential environmental consequences while
106. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 22.
107. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(A).
108. Id § 2171(c)(1)(C).
109. Council on Environmental Quality, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17
(1993).





preparing proposals for legislation, as well as to ensure that
Congress and the public are informed of the environmental impact
of legislative proposals.113 The Supreme Court has noted that
"the thrust of [the EIS] is ... that environmental concerns be
integrated into the very process of agency decisionmaking. The
'detailed statement' it requires is the outward sign that environ-
mental values and consequences have been considered during the
planning stage of agency actions."
114
The court of appeals, in making the threshold for final agency
action so high, may have thwarted the purpose of the EIS al-
together. In Public Citizen 3, the court of appeals effectively held
that an agency's proposal for legislation can be prepared and
presented to Congress without environmental review, and that no
one has standing to challenge it. This clearly does not fulfill the
above-articulated intentions of the EIS as defined by the Supreme
Court.
In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education
Project,1" the Supreme Court held that the EIS:
[T]hus serves twin aims. The first is to inject environmental
considerations into the federal agency's decisionmaking process
by requiring the agency to prepare an EIS. The second aim is
to inform the public that the agency has considered environ-
mental concerns in its decisionmaking process. Through the
disclosure of an EIS, the public is made aware that the agency
has taken environmental considerations into account.
11 6
With respect to NAFTA, the EIS would have forced the USTR to
contemplate the potential environmental concerns NAFTA might
generate. In turn, the USTR would have had the opportunity to
address those concerns within the Agreement, rather than omitting
considerations of environmental consequences or leaving them to
be dealt with in non-binding supplemental accords.
11 7
113. Bear, supra note 20, at 3.
114. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979).
115. 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
116. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143.
117. If the USTR had been required to prepare an EIS on NAFTA, it would have
identified environmental hazards such as the pollution at the United States-Mexico border
and consequently, might have included a provision within NAFTA to address the
condition. Instead, President Clinton attempted to address border clean-up in non-binding
supplemental agreements to NAFTA. The disadvantage of having environmental concerns
dealt with only in side agreements is that side agreements are not legislation; rather, they
are executive agreements. Consequently, they are not ratified by Congress and are not
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EIS jurisprudence is somewhat conflicting. Following the
enactment of NEPA, courts have "repeatedly held that an agency's
failure to prepare a legislative EIS on the proposal is subject to
judicial review.""' 8 When an agency issues a license to build a
power plant, or leases federal lands for mining, the courts have not
waited until the private company begins operating the plant or
mining the land to review EIS claims. 9 According to estab-
lished NEPA jurisprudence, the time for judicial intervention is
"when the report or recommendation on the proposal is made, and
someone protests either the absence or the adequacy of the final
impact statement."'" Conflicts typically arise regarding the time
when an agency action is sufficiently complete to be open to
challenge for lack of an EIS.
Public Citizen's first challenge to the USTR's failure to
prepare an EIS in 1992 illustrates this friction.12' At that time,
the district court held that there was no agency action in place to
trigger NEPA's EIS requirement because NAFTA was still in the
negotiation stage.122 When Public Citizen brought its second suit
in 1993, however, the USTR had finalized NAFTA. According to
the holding in Public Citizen 1, then, the court should have found
that NAFTA was a sufficiently complete agency action. Yet, in
Public Citizen 3, the court of appeals ruled that the USTR's
version of NAFFA was not a final agency action sufficient to
trigger the EIS requirement."2 Thus, there remained no judicial-
ly appropriate time to question the lack of an EIS on NAFrA.'24
This obstacle to enforcement contradicts the essential purpose
of the EIS. The EIS exists in order to provoke contemplation of
enforceable against the United States, Canada, or Mexico.
118. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 40.
119. See LaFlamme v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.
1988); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
120. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n.15 (1976).
121. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992).
122. Id.
123. The court of appeals found that NAFTA was not a final action of the USTR
because the President had final responsibility for submitting NAFTA to Congress. Public
Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549,553 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Court did not
find that NAFTA itself was incomplete. Id. For further discussion, see supra parts
IV(A)(1) and (2).
124. If this holding is followed to its reasonable conclusion, no foreign trade agreement
negotiated under the Trade Act of 1974-such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade-will be challengeable under the APA.
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the potential environmental impact of agency proposals while the
actions are being developed, as well as to provide information and
insight to Congress." Yet, under the court of appeals' reason-
ing, courts can only recognize a challenge for the failure to prepare
an EIS when an agency presents a final proposal without one, and
the challengers can prove that the agency action will directly affect
them.
12 6
V. THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE IN NEGOTIATING NAFTA
In Public Citizen 3, the Government argued that the Presi-
dent, and not the USTR, was primarily responsible for NAFTA
because the President was required to submit NAFTA to Congress
for approval.127 The Government argued that the judiciary does
not have jurisdiction to order an EIS in compliance with
NEPA'2 because the President's actions are not subject to
judicial review under the APA. 2 9 The court of appeals agreed.
A panel of three judges accepted Franklin v. Massachusetts"° as
controlling and found that the USTR's action was not final."'
Consequently, the action was not subject to such review because
such review is limited to agency action and not to Presidential ac-
tion.
132
A. Franklin v. Massachusetts is Distinguishable from Public
Citizen v. US. Trade Representative
In Franklin, the Supreme Court found that there was no final
agency action when the Secretary of Commerce submitted the
125. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.1 (1993). See supra part II for a discussion of the purpose of the EIS.
126. In Public Citizen, the circuit court followed the holding of Kleppe v. Sierra Club:
"[Tihe moment at which an agency must have a final statement ready 'is the time at which
it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action."' Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390,405-06 (1976) (citing Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S.
283, 320 (1975)). Thus, no cause of action can arise for failure to prepare an EIS until the
proposal is made without one. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 554.
127. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 551.
128. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 19-20.
129. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See
also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the President is not
an agency within the meaning of the APA).
130. 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). See supra note 34 for a concise description of the Franklin
case holding and infra part V(A) for a discussion of the Franklin case.
131. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 550.
132. Id. at 549.
1994]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
census totals to the President.13 The Court believed that the
Secretary of Commerce's proposals for congressional redistricting
were only recommendations to the President, not final proposals
subject to rubber-stamp approval.' 4 The final action occurred
only when the President submitted his proposal to Congress for
reapportionment of congressional districts.135 Relying on Frank-
lin, the Government argued in Public Citizen 2 that the need for
the President to submit NAFTA to Congress meant that the
USTR's version of NAFTA was not yet final.136 Because there
was no final agency action, there was no APA jurisdiction. 37
Additionally, the Government emphasized that NAFTA was really
presidential action, and such actions are not subject to review
under the APA. 38
The Government analogized the situation in Franklin to that
of Public Citizen 2, although Franklin addresses neither NEPA nor
the EIS requirement. 39 The Government asserted that like the
census data, NA-FTA must be submitted to Congress by the
President to become "final."' 4 Thus, there was no final agency
action under the APA to be reviewed by the court.
41
Public Citizen, in contrast, argued that the census data
provided by the Secretary of Commerce to the President was
preliminary, and it was left to the President to use the data to
make recommendations for reapportionment of congressional
districts. 42 These circumstances differ from those surrounding
NAFTA. NAFTA was not a preliminary recommendation subject
to the President's alteration. The President did not change the
USTR's version of NAFTA before submitting it to Congress.
In order to avoid jurisdiction under the APA, the Govern-
ment also argued that NAFTA was not final because the President
was not obligated to submit NAFTA to Congress.43 Public
Citizen rebutted this argument by pointing out that even though
133. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2767.
134. Id. at 2770.
135. Id.
136. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 20.
137. Id.
138. Id. See also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
139. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 19.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 38.
143. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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the President had the power to submit NAFTA to Congress, the
USTR's obligation to prepare an EIS was an independent statutory
duty and, thus, was reviewable as soon as the negotiation process
was completed without complying with NEPA.'44 The district
court, accepting Public Citizen's argument, found that according to
case law, "NEPA requires that an EIS must be prepared for
legislative proposals."'45  Thus, "case law is clear that an EIS
must be prepared once such a proposal is completed ... its
submission to Congress is not required."'" On appeal, however,
the panel relied on Franklin47 and found that "the core question
is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process,
and whether the result of that process is one that will directly
affect the parties."'" In Public Citizen 3, the court of appeals
found that unless NAFTA was submitted to Congress, NAFTA
would not directly affect the plaintiffs.'49 Additionally, the court
held that NAFTA was not a final agency action unless and until
the President submitted the Agreement to Congress. 5 '
This reasoning is inherently contradictory. When the USTR
completed its negotiation process, NAFTA was final.' Yet, the
court of appeals ruled that NAFTA could not be considered final
until the President took further action, even though the Agree-
ment itself would not change. According to this ruling, a product
of the USTR will never be deemed final, although the USTR is
considered a federal agency, and thus should be subject to NEPA
and the APA. Surely, the court did not intend this problematic
result.
A decision based on the President's foreign policy powers or
on the Trade Act of 1974 would have been more consistent with
144. Id. at 552.
145. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 26 (D.D.C. 1993)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added)).
146. Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. 21, 26 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing Izaak Walton League of
America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981), Trustees
for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986)).
147. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
148. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992)).
149. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 550.
150. Id.
151. See President's Statement on the Completion of Negotiations on the North
American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 64; President's Remarks on Signing the
North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 65.
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prior APA jurisprudence. In Public Citizen 3, however, the court's
holding effectively nullifies the legislative EIS by requiring that a
federal agency action be final enough to directly affect the parties
seeking resolution.
B. The "Direct Effects" Test
The "direct effects" requirement arising from Public Citizen
3 makes it very difficult for an agency action to be considered
"final" under the APA, and contradicts prior APA jurisprudence.
The court of appeals explained the "direct effects" test in the
following manner: "[t]o determine whether an agency action is
final, 'the core question is whether the agency has completed its
decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is
one that will directly affect the parties."" 52  The role of many
federal agencies is to formulate proposals for legislation that will
only become final after revision and approval by Congress. Under
the "direct effects" test, the only point at which an agency's
proposal will become final is if Congress implements the proposal.
This test defeats the purpose of the legislative EIS, which is meant
to provide information to Congress and the public on the potential
environmental impact that legislation will have if it is in fact
implemented153
To justify this result, the Government argued that Franklin
should only apply when the President is responsible for taking final
action on an agency proposal and has not delegated that pow-
er.154 The court of appeals explained that Franklin applied to
"those cases in which the President has final constitutional or
statutory responsibility for the final step necessary for the agency
action directly to affect the parties.""' The problem with ex-
panding Franklin's "direct effects" test beyond instances where the
President has final, if symbolic, responsibility for implementing
administrative agency actions can be explained as follows:
To the extent that Franklin stands for the proposition that the
APA provides no basis for obtaining substantive review of
152. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 550-51 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. at 2773
(1993)).
153. See supra part II for a discussion of the purpose of the legislative EIS.
154. Reply Brief for Appellant at 10, Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822
F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993) (No. 93-5212).
155. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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advice given by agencies to the President, it hardly revolutioniz-
es the legal landscape.
The Office seeks to expand Franklin greatly to preclude
challenges to agencies' violations of their independent statutory
obligations, whenever the violations relate to matters on which
the President has final decisional authority.
15 6
Thus, the "direct effects" test implicates many actions in which the
executive branch plays a nominal role in the "final" submission of
agency proposals to Congress. Public Citizen identified the
problems inherent in the "direct effects" test:
If judicial review is unavailable simply because some other
entity in the Executive Branch ... must do something else
before the action will be final, in all senses of the word, and its
harm can be felt by the plaintiffs, the legislative EIS require-
ment can be written out of NEPA. Indeed, if a legislative
proposal is not final for APA purposes until Congress enacts it,
then a NEPA legislative EIS challenge would become moot at
the same moment it became ripe.'57
Public Citizen argued that Franklin should apply only in
instances when the President must take some discretionary action
to make the agency proposal final, as in Franklin itself, where the
President was statutorily obligated to decide how to use the census
figures in the reapportionment of congressional districts. NAFTA,
like many other agency actions that flow through the executive
branch, was finalized by the USTR and did not require a Presiden-
tial discretionary act for its completion.158
In the concurring opinion to Public Citizen 3, Judge Randolph
expressed concern that the holding effectively nullifies the "legisla-
tive EIS" requirement.15 9 He stated that holding administrative
agency proposals for legislation to a "direct effect" test before the
action is subject to judicial review could end the requirement:
[It] is difficult to see how the act of proposing legislation could
generate direct effects on parties, or anyone else for that matter.
... [O]nly a Member of Congress may introduce a bill embody-
ing the proposal, and even then no one will be affected, directly
156. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 37.
157. Id. at 45.
158. Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 553.
159. Id. Judge Randolph explained only that he concurred in the result but did not
offer a separate rationale. His concurrence seemed skeptical of the majority's attempt to
limit Franklin's holding in a way that would preserve the legislative EIS. Id.
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or otherwise, unless and until Congress passes the bill and the
President signs it into law. If one takes Franklin at its word, a
legislative proposal's lack of any direct effects would seem to
mean that there can be no final action sufficient to permit
judicial review under the APA.1"
In attempting to protect the USTR from having to comply
with NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement, the
court of appeals may have initiated a trend that prohibits anyone
from compelling an agency to fulfill the EIS obligation. The
language used in Public Citizen 3 makes it unlikely that this
holding can be limited to foreign trade agreements.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC CITIZEN CASES ON
FOREIGN POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTIONS
Another argument the Government asserted in the Public
Citizen cases against application of the EIS requirement to
NAFTA was that if APA jurisdiction was granted over the USTR,
it would violate the separation of powers doctrine.161 The
Government alleged that subjecting NAFTA to the APA would
infringe upon the President's power to conduct foreign affairs.
162
The district court, however, found that an exercise of APA
jurisdiction in this case did not infringe upon the President's power
to conduct foreign policy, because the Agreement was final and
the only remaining action was the domestic one of submitting the
legislation to Congress.163 Judge Ritchey also noted that Article
I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution gives Congress the power
to regulate foreign commerce. t64 The notion that Congress has
a broad plenary power to regulate foreign commerce is well estab-
lished. 165 Both Houses of Congress needed to approve NAFTA,
as it is composed of legislation that affects local, state, and national
160. Id. at 553-54.
161. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp 21, 24 (D.D.C. 1993);
Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
162. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 26-27.
163. Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. at 27. "The EIS requirement is, therefore, a domestic
issue, where an agency must inform the relevant decision makers, in this case the Congress,
of the environmental consequences of a proposal for legislation." ld. See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C).
164. Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. at 26.
165. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 438 (1979); California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
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laws."6 This principle counters the Government's argument that
preparing an EIS for NAFTA would interfere with the President's
power to conduct foreign policy.
The court of appeals does not adequately consider the foreign
policy implications of its decision. Although the Government
raised these considerations, the court felt that they were outside
the scope of the case.
1 67
A. Ramifications on Future Trade Agreements
Public Citizen appealed the circuit court's decision to the
Supreme Court, with the hope of clarifying the role of the
legislative EIS in trade agreements, legislative proposals, and other
agency actions that require presidential involvement." The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, so the ruling in Public Citizen 3
stands.69 Thus, the USTR is not obligated to prepare an EIS for
trade agreements.
This outcome is troublesome. Recent trends indicate that the
globalization of trade will continue. 7 ° Other countries that were
parties to past trade agreements have challenged domestic health
and safety laws as barriers to trade, in the name of international
harmonization of health and safety standards. For instance, under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), Mexico
successfully challenged a provision of the U.S. Marine Mammal
Protection Act1 7' as a non-tariff trade barrier.'72
166. See supra note 89 for an explanation of why NAFTA is not a treaty, but a nonself-
executing congressional-executive agreement. NAFTA requires approval of both houses
of Congress before it can be effective, in contrast to a foreign treaty, which constitutionally
requires ratification only by the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
167. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Not considering foreign policy considerations is consistent with standing judicial policy to
refuse to decide issues of law on constitutional grounds when they can be addressed
otherwise. For a discussion of judicial restraint, see generally GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51-64 (12th ed. 1991).
168. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), petition
for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 2150 (Nov. 9, 1993) (No. 93-560).
169. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994) (denying petition
for certiorari).
170. See, e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 187, and recent revisions of GATT in the "Uruguay Round." President
Clinton also negotiated with Far East nations to enhance U.S. trading opportunities in
Asia. See James Risen, Trade Emerges As World's Big Issue, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Dec. 19, 1993, at C3; Jim Hoagland, Looking Ahead: At Home and Abroad, WASH. POST,
Nov. 8, 1992, at Al.
171. U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1994).
1994]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act bans the import of tuna
that is caught using methods deadly to dolphins.173 The GATT
dispute resolution panel found that U.S. restrictions on the method
of production, rather than on the quality of the product, were
insupportable barriers to trade under GAT.'74  Many other
health and safety laws have been challenged under GAIT, such as
restrictions on tobacco advertising,'75 a ban on hormone-treated
beeft 7 6 and fuel economy standards.'77
By requesting an EIS, Public Citizen sought to ensure that
Congress would foresee and contemplate international preemption
of environmental, health, and safety laws before it votes on trade
agreements."' The purpose of the EIS is to provide insight into
the environmental implications of legislative proposals. By
excluding the Office of the USTR from this requirement, the court
of appeals has disabled the EIS from fulfilling its function.
To defend its position that the USTR need not prepare an
EIS, the Government explained that "[t]he effects of broad,
complex changes in economic relationships, such as those set in
motion by trade agreements, are too attenuated to be cognizable
under NEPA.' ' 179 Nevertheless, the fact that the environmental
impact of a governmental action may be far reaching and affect a
broad area does not warrant the abandonment of NEPA and its
required EIS. The Supreme Court has noted that, "the absence of
a geographical nexus does not defeat a claim of standing because
that would mean that the most injurious and widespread Govern-
172. See R. Kenton Musgrave & Garland Stephens, The GATT Tuna- Dolphin Dispute:
An Update, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957 (1993); Don Mayer & David Hoch, International
Environmental Protection and The GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin Controversy, 31 AM. Bus.
L.J. 187 (1993).
173. Musgrave & Stephens, supra note 172, at 961.
174. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 5-6.
175. See American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, The Worldwide
Smoking Epidemic: Tobacco Trade, Use & Control, 263 JAMA 3312 (1990).
176. See Michael B. Froman, Recent Developments: International Trade-The United
States-European Community Hormone Beef Conflict, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 549 (1989).
177. See Report of the Panel on United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, GATT Doc. L/6175 (June 17, 1987), reprinted in GAIT, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DoCUMENTS 136 (34th Supp. 1988).
178. For instance, the current renegotiation of GATr, the Uruguay Round, has been
introduced to Congress without an EIS. Like NAFTA, GATT poses substantial threats
to the environment. Because the USTR cannot be compelled to prepare an EIS on
GATr, Congress will consider and vote on GATr implementing legislation without an EIS
for guidance.
179. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 49.
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ment actions could be questioned by nobody."'" Furthermore,
EISs are regularly prepared on proposals for legislation that may
by nature be hypothetical:
The agency need not foresee the unforeseeable, but by the same
token neither can it avoid drafting an impact statement simply
because describing the environmental effects of and alternatives
to particular agency action involves some degree of forecasting.
... [T]he basic thrust of NEPA is to predict the environmental
effects of proposed action before the action is taken and those
effects fully known. Reasonable forecasting and speculation is
thus implicit in NEPA, and we must reject any attempt by
agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by labeling
any and all discussion of future environmental effects as "crystal
ball inquiry."''
NEPA requires all agencies of the Federal Government to
prepare an EIS for "every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.' 18 It is difficult
to understand how an agreement that even the Government
concedes83 will potentially have broad effects on many aspects
of America's environment can fall outside of "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.
i' 4
B. Impact of Decision on APA Jurisprudence
Several cases have cited the Public Citizen cases as dispositive
of what constitutes final agency action. In Sabella v. United
States,'" plaintiff fishermen sought an injunction against the
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") because the NMFS
allegedly planned to enforce the encirclement provision of the
International Dolphin Conservation Act of 19921" against plain-
tiffs."8 The court found, however, that there was no final agency
action to review because the NMFS had issued only an advisory
180. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
181. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
183. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 32, at 41-42.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
185. Sabella v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994).
186. 16 U.S.C. § 1417(a)(2) (1994).
187. Sabella, 863 F. Supp at 2.
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opinion stating how it planned to enforce the encirclement provi-
sions but had not yet issued definitive enforcement rules."s The
court cited the Public Citizen cases as standing for the proposition
that "final agency action is an independent jurisdictional require-
ment [that] must be met first before moving on to the question of
ripeness."' 89
More specifically, Public Citizen brought a similar suit against
the USTR seeking an EIS for the GATT." In Public Citizen v.
Kantor, three causes of action were asserted. First, Public Citizen
sought to compel the USTR to prepare an EIS for the GATT. 9'
Second, it sought to require the USTR to promulgate general
procedures to ensure compliance with NEPA during the negotia-
tion of future trade agreements.'9 Finally, Public Citizen asked
the court to exercise its authority to grant mandamus relief
compelling federal officials to perform their non-discretionary
statutory duties.'93
The district court ruled against Public Citizen and held that it
did not have power under the APA to review the actions of the
USTR.'" This case reaffirms that trade agreements, although
primarily the products of the USTR, are not agency actions within
the meaning of the APA. The court stated that "the APA claim
is barred by the principle ... that APA review requires final
agency action . . . . This requirement cannot be met where
Congress provides that only the President may take final ac-
tion. ' '  Yet, nowhere in this case, nor in the earlier Public
Citizen cases, did the Government prove that Congress intended
USTR actions to be considered final only if introduced to Con-
gress by the President. These holdings place a presidential
contingency not apparent in law on agency proposals for legisla-
tion. If this reasoning is carried to its logical conclusion, there will
be no APA jurisdiction over an agency's action any time it crafts
a proposal that Congress or the President must approve. This
188. Id. at 2-3.
189. Id. at 3. See infra text accompanying note 211 for a criticism of the policy of
requiring final agency action before the question of ripeness can be addressed. This rule,
in effect, merges the justiciability doctrines of standing and ripeness.
190. Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994).
191. Id. at 210.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 211.
195. Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208, 211 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1994).
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reasoning directly contradicts the APA, which states only that the
agency's action must be final before a party can challenge its
deficiency, not that it must actually be implemented.'
16
VII. STANDING ISSUES
A. The "Direct Effects" Test Merges the Doctrines of Standing
and Ripeness
In Public Citizen 1, the plaintiffs were denied standing
because the negotiation of NAFTA was incomplete."9 The court
held, therefore, that Public Citizen could not point to a sufficiently
cognizable injury. 98  In the second round of Public Citizen v.
US Trade Representative, however, NAFTA negotiations were
final, and Public Citizen sufficiently alleged a cognizable injury at
risk under NAFTA. 9
To satisfy standing requirements, Public Citizen had to show
that the lack of an EIS on NAFTA posed a substantial risk of
harm.200 Thus, Public Citizen pointed to several sections of
NAIFTA that could preempt both state and local laws as non-tariff
trade barriers.2"' Additionally, members of Public Citizen,
particularly those in California and Texas, would be placed at risk
of specific harm if NAFTA passed and such laws were chal-
196. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
197. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139, 139 (D.D.C.), affd,
970 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
198. Id.
199. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 23-24 (D.D.C. 1993).
200. Id. at 27-28.
201. Id.
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lenged. 2  The district court recognized that state and local
environmental laws are at risk of preemption under NAFTA:
NAFTA, by its very terms, sets forth criteria that may form a
basis for challenging various domestic health and environmental
laws . . . . Those laws that are found to be contrary to the
NAFTA's free trade provisions either cannot be applied or can
become the basis of trade sanctions .... In addition, by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause, a state law that conflicts with the
NAFTA is preempted by the NAFTA.03
A cognizable injury is recognized for standing purposes if there is
a "reasonable risk that environmental harm may occur. '
The district court also recognized that "the allegations of
possible environmental harm as a result of NAFTA to members of
the Plaintiff organizations who live on the United States-Mexico
border region are sufficiently concrete as to establish stand-
ing. '  Members of Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and Friends of
the Earth live near the Maquiladora region in Mexico, where U.S.
companies have established factories in a small-scale free trade
zone. In the region, "[s]urface and ground water contamination
from raw sewage, industrial wastewater, pesticides, and solvents
have, according to an American Medical Association study, made
the border area 'a virtual cesspool and breeding ground for
202. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 12-14. Public Citizen, Sierra Club and
Friend of the Earth have thousands of members who reside in California and Texas. Id.
at 46. Because of the Maquiladora program, U.S. industrial development along the border
in Northern Mexico has been extensive. Id. at 13. Air and water quality has greatly
diminished in these regions due to this development, with pollution crossing the border
and specifically afflicting the cities of San Diego and El Paso. Id. at 46. Under NAFTA,
there are incentives to continue to develop this region, but there are few provisions to
fund corrective measures. Id. at 48. A full explanation of the potential environmental
harm posed by NAFTA is beyond the scope of this paper. For further detail, see SIERRA
CLUB, ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE NORTH
AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (1993); Robert W. Benson,
Free Trade As an Extremist Ideology: The Case of NAFTA, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
555 (1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE: INFORMATION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT (1991); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT OF MAQUILADORAS' WASTE HAMPERED
BY LACK OF INFORMATION (1992).
203. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1993)
(citing NAFTA, ch. 7, art. 105).
204. Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492 (D.C. Cir.
1990); see also Public Citizen, 822 F. Supp. at 28.
205. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 43-44.
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infectious diseases."' 6 The area also suffers from overcrowding,
increased air pollution, and heightened percentages of birth defects
traceable to the pollution problems.2
Judge Ritchey rejected the Government's argument that
"many of the alleged environmental effects of the NAFTA are too
widespread to be confined to a particular geographical lo-
cation."2 8 Instead, the district court found that "the absence of
a geographical nexus does not defeat a claim of standing because
that 'would mean that the most injurious and widespread Govern-
ment actions could be questioned by nobody."'" The issue of
redressability in cases of potentially widespread environmental
harm is implicated in the appellate decision. If the EIS require-
ment does not apply to the USTR, then NAFTA and any future
trade agreements are exempt from NEPA's environmental
safeguards.
The court of appeals ruled that no "direct effect" could result
from an agency-created proposal for legislation that requires
further action by the President. Therefore, a future plaintiff will
not have standing to bring a case such as Public Citizen v. U.S.
Trade Representative. Any case challenging USTR actions will
follow the 1992 decision in which the Court's holding was based on
standing grounds; i.e., because the USTR's action was not final, it
was not subject to judicial review.21 According to the Franklin
decision, finality only arises when the President submits a proposal
to Congress.2 ' Under this test, future USTR actions will never
be sufficiently final for APA purposes. Thus, as the court of
appeals concluded, "NAFTA's fate now rests in the hands of the
206. Id. at 4. See also American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, A
Permanent U.S.-Mexico Border Envtl. Health Comm'n, 263 JAMA 3319 (1990).
207. See David C. Warner, Health Issues at the U.S.-Mexican Border, 265 JAMA 242
(1991).
208. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 28 (D.D.C. 1993).
209. Id. (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973)).
210. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139, (D.D.C.) affd, 970
F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
211. This point illustrates a problematic barrier to review in EIS cases-the merging
of the doctrines of standing and ripeness. See Bridget A. Hust, Ripeness Doctrine in
NEPA Cases: A Rotten Jurisdictional Barrier, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 505 (1993).
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political branches. The judiciary has no role to play. 12
B. Informational Standing
Public Citizen also raised the question of informational
standing. Public Citizen argued that because of the failure of the
USTR to prepare an EIS, they were unable to keep their member-
ship adequately informed.213
Case law provides some support for this contention, notably
in Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. ("SIPI") v.
Atomic Energy Commission,2"4  and Competitive Enterprises
Institute v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA",).215 In SIPI v. Atomic Energy Commission, the court
stated in dicta that an organization might have standing because it
distributed scientific information to the public, an activity that
would be adversely affected if the agency failed to prepare an
EIS.216 In Competitive Enterprises Institute v. NHTSA, the court
held that "[a]llegations of injury to an organization's ability to
disseminate information may be deemed sufficiently particular for
standing purposes where that information is essential to the injured
organization's activities.
' 217
In Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng,21 however, the
court found that although "the Foundation has adequately alleged
injury through the deprivation of information, '219 it still did not
have standing.' There, as in the Public Citizen cases, the court
found that the Foundation had not pointed to an agency action
that triggered the EIS requirement; thus, their informational claim
was not ripe.221 The Lyng court also noted the dilemma present
in the Public Citizen cases, "[w]e recognize that this tends to
212. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
213. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 49. Recall that a purpose of the
legislative EIS is to provide information to the public as well as to Congress on agency
proposals for legislation. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1994). See supra part II for a discussion of
the purpose of the legislative EIS.
214. 481 F.2d 1079, 1079 (D.C. Cir 1973).
215. 901 F.2d 107, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
216. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d at 1086-
1087 n.29.
217. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d at 142
n.6.
218. 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).





merge standing under the APA with the merits of a plaintiff's
NEPA claim. '222 If an organization cannot obtain standing when
an agency has failed to prepare an EIS, then jurisdiction under the
APA becomes impossible to obtain, as APA jurisdiction is contin-
gent upon pointing to a final agency action.22
Judge Ritchey, although granting Public Citizen standing on
other grounds, noted that "the Supreme Court has stated that such
[informational] injury is within the zone of interest that NEPA was
designed to protect." 4 The court of appeals did not address the
issue of informational standing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Public Citizen 2, the district court decided that because
NEPA and the APA apply to the USTR, the USTR failed to fulfill
its NEPA obligation by not providing an EIS for NAFTA. Part
of the underlying rationale was that Congress clearly created
* NEPA to provide a method of environmental review for proposed
legislation. By reversing Public Citizen 2, the D.C. Circuit has
removed the EIS process of environmental review from interna-
tional trade agreements, and potentially from all agency actions
requiring some "final" action or approval by the President. The
EIS provides an essential safeguard on agency action by ensuring
that agencies consider the environmental impact of their proposals
and by informing both the public and Congress about the impact.
Without the EIS, the environmental costs of such agency actions
will be overlooked.
Trade agreements such as NAFTA and GATT have a
profound impact on many aspects of life in the United States.
Many U.S. laws are at risk of preemption under the agreements,
the U.S. and Mexican environment faces grave threats of damage
from polluting factories at the border, and U.S. health and safety
standards can be undermined as non-tariff trade barriers. The
kinds of environmental risks posed by foreign trade agreements
should be catalogued in an EIS, in order to provide Congress and
222. Id. at 85-86.
223. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 552.
224. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 29 n.12 (D.D.C.
1993). See also Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lawrence Gerschwer,
Note, Informational Standing Under the NEPA: Justiciability and the Environmental
Decision Making Process, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 996 (1993).
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the public with trustworthy information about the environmental
consequences of such agreements. This would be more in accord
with the CEQ guidelines, and more in line with congressional
intent for NEPA.
It would have been less harmful to NEPA jurisprudence for
the D.C. Circuit to rest its decision in Public Citizen 3 on foreign
policy considerations or on the political question doctrine, rather
than on the "direct effects" test of Franklin.' Of course, there
are dual motives to electing the "direct effects" route. First,
federal courts generally abide by the prudential mandate to abstain
from deciding legal issues on constitutional principles if there is an
alternative method to resolve the issue.2 6  Second, there were
strong political mandates to keep NAFTA exempt from the EIS
requirements and, had the court found final agency action, it
would have been difficult to ignore the strong precedents requiring
EISs on final agency actions.' In order to protect NAFTA, the
EIS had to be neutralized. The court achieved its goal by
restricting the ability to protest an agency's failure to prepare an
EIS to when that agency's action would "directly affect" the
parties. This decision will be costly, however. Any administrative
agency proposal for legislation, by definition, cannot directly affect
anyone unless and until it is approved by both houses of Congress
and signed by the President. As a primary purpose of the EIS is
to provide information to Congress while it is considering agency
proposals for legislation, the holding of the Public Citizen cases
defeats the purpose of the EIS.
The Government argued that preparing an EIS for a trade
agreement like NAFTA would be close to impossible, and
therefore, might foreclose or seriously burden the President's
ability to negotiate foreign trade treaties. U.S. Solicitor General
Drew S. Days III, stated on behalf of the Government that
"[Judge] Ritchey had ordered a study of 'the world with NAFTA,
as opposed to the world without NAFTA' and 'we seriously do not
believe that can be done."'
225. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
226. See GUNTHER, supra note 167, for details on judicial restraint.
227. See, e.g., the strong mandate from the CEQ requiring EISs on treaties, supra note
103 and accompanying text, and the language of NEPA itself, supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
228. Dori Meinert, Judges Look for Ways to Duck NAFTA Issue, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Aug. 25, 1993, at C-1.
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Public Citizen, however, explained that the real fight is
"about how environmental and health impacts of trade pacts will
be assessed and accounted for in the future."229 Public Citizen
attorney Patty Goldman explained that "the environmental groups
plan to press their case even if the legal route proves much slower
than the political one. We want to set these principles in place
forever. Even if we don't get an EIS for NAFTA, we want the
ruling in place for the next trade treaty.
230
The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in the Public
Citizen cases, thus finalizing the holding in Public Citizen 3, at least
for the D.C. Circuit. Public Citizen has continued to seek EISs for
foreign trade agreements, most notably the GATT."' The goal
is to ascertain a mandate that the federal government will be
required to fulfill its NEPA obligations in all legislation, including
future trade agreements.
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